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Credibility Begins with a Clear
Commitment to Price Stability
by Jerry L. Jordan
An the summer of 1971. the United States
suspended the limited convertibility of
the dollar for gold. Convertibility had not
been operational for some time, except
to foreign governments by special arrange-
ment. Nevertheless, with the suspension
came the recognition that America had
cast aside its last formal commitment to
gold convertibility and was now operating
on a purely fiat currency. The idea of the
dollar first being one-twentieth and then
one-thirty-fifth of an ounce of gold, then
being "worth" what a dollar would buy.
without reference to some more basic
standard of value, was a gradual process.
The performance of currencies lacking
a nominal anchor has been an important
factor in determining economic condi-
tions in the United States—and through-
out the world—since that time. Without a
long-run anchor of valuation such as gold,
the decisions and actions of monetary
policy authorities start to have a signifi-
cant influence on long-run economic
performance. The vagaries of the gold
market that often led to sharp upswings
and downturns in the price level, but
around a constant trend, have been re-
placed by the day-to-day judgments of
central bankers. Although policymakers
have eliminated the large cyclical fluc-
tuations in the price level, they have done
so at the cost of a long-term decline in
the purchasing power of money.
The actual effects of Federal Reserve
policy actions depend, in part, on the
public's prior expectations of current
policies and on iis current expectations
of future policies. Expectations influence
the results of policy through a variety
of channels. Expectations of future
prices in financial markets affect interest
rates and a wide variety of contracts
that, in turn, affect prices and real eco-
nomic activity, particularly through
decisions about saving and investing.
A broad set of factors influences the
public's expectations of Federal Reserve
policy, including history, recent public
announcements, and individual percep-
tions of the views held by monetary
policymakers. Actual policy decisions
depend importantly on the incentives and
constraints facing policymakers. These
incentives and constraints color how
people form expectations about future
intlation and how firmly they adhere to
them in the face of changing economic
circumstances and political pressures.
• The Importance of Expectations
Almost every decision we make in our
lives is based on expectations about the
behavior of others. When driving on a
two-lane road passing motorists going
the other way at 60 miles per hour, you
do so under the assumption that they
will stay in their own lane: After all,
this is the law, the custom, and in the
self-interest of everyone involved. Such
expectations are so well founded and so
seldom wrong that we don't give them a
second thought.
Another example might be our expecta-
tions about work, which also consider
the future behavior of others. Employees
expect certain working conditions, pay,
and job security, whether or not these
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factors are written into contracts. Poli-
cies, both governmental and within the
company, help people form expectations:
how the company has treated others in
the past also enters the equation. The
employer gets a reputation for playing
(or not playing) by the rules, which
affects the quality of the people that apply
for future employment.
Many of the stressful situations we see
in the labor arena today are a result of
frustrated expectations. Some companies
have found that they promised employ-
ees too much relative to current and ex-
pected future income. This change in
expectations leads to difficult adjust-
ments that may show up in national
economic statistics and represent sub-
stantial human suffering.
Expectations about economic policy are
also important. The recent tax policy
changes will have profound effects on
the economy. Apart from the merits of
the particular changes, though, is the
adjustment cost that occurs just because
the policies were enacted. People who
\ 0428-1276made decisions based on one tax struc-
ture now find themselves living in a
world with different rules, (t can be a
little like pulling onto the highway, only
to find that everyone else is suddenly
driving on.the left side of the road.
Expectations about future monetary pol-
icy are my immediate concern. Think
about the problems people have encoun-
tered by investing in real estate over the
last two decades. The run-up of inflation
in the 1960s and 1970s led many inves-
tors to bet on land, real estate, and other
inflation-sensitive assets. Real estate
prices rose much faster than the general
price level for decades. As the rate of
inflation accelerated in the 1960s and
1970s, real estate prices soared to levels
that could be supported only by a con-
tinuation and, in some cases, a further
acceleration of inflation.
• The Need for a Credible
Commitment to Price Stability
The lack of a credible commitment to
price stability after the gold standard
was abolished meant the end of a crucial
constraint on monetary policy actions.
Without a clear nominal objective,
money growth and the consequent im-
plications for prices were set adrift. In
the past 20 years, they have floated
where the political winds and various
external shocks have taken them.
Today we are left in a situation in
which expectations about the future
value of the dollar reflect the public's
knowledge—borne of and verified by
experience—that while monetary poli-
cymakers may have the best of inten-
tions, the value of the dollar depends
strongly on their judgments about the
nature of economic conditions and
about the appropriate level of short-term
interest rates. As a result, expectations
vary greatly among economic decision-
makers and respond to events in largely
unpredictable ways. At present, expec-
tations embody higher long-term infla-
tion than is healthy for the economy or
than the monetary policymakers desire
and plan to produce.
When people base their decisions on
the assumption that future inflation will
be higher than policymakers intend to
deliver, the economy's performance
shudders, like a machine with sand in
the gears. An inflation risk premium is
built into long-term interest rates and
raises the cost of capital. Labor negotia-
tions become contentious as workers try
to protect themselves from the expected
inflation while employers try to insulate
themselves from the risk of being
caught with rising costs in a world where
price stability is possible.
Because they have been fooled so often
in the past, people are reluctant to mod-
ify their expectations without hard evi-
dence—and quite rightly so. It wouldn't
do policymakers any good to revise
their objectives upward, because people
would then simply adjust their expecta-
tions even higher. The only solution
is to find a way to enable the central
bank to commit to an explicit long-term
objective of price stability.
• Households and Inflation
Although the rising inflationary trend
of the 1970s was halted in the 1980s,
inflation has continued to lift the general
price level by 3 to 4 percent per year.
Consequently, it should come as no sur-
prise that people do not believe that the
Federal Reserve is committed to a long-
term objective of purchasing power sta-
bility. In the University of Michigan's
Survey of Consumers, for example,
households continue to forecast inflation
exceeding 4 percent over the next five
to ten years. Although long-term interest
rates have declined substantially, current
levels still indicate that the public expects
inflation to trudge forward. At best, the
steeply upward-sloping yield curve sug-
gests that market participants envision
little further progress on price stability.
The key to even lower long-term bond
yields and mortgage rates is tied to the
public's beliefs about the future purchas-
ing power of the dollar.
In the 1950s and early 1960s, people
were more inclined than they are today
to view increases in inflation and inter-
est rates as temporary. Consumers, it
seemed, expected a sound dollar. Then,
sometime in the late 1960s and 1970s,
people began to view declines in in-
flation and interest rates as temporary.
They have now come to expect a continu-
ing depreciation in the value of the dollar.
The challenge to today's monetary poli-
cymakers is to reverse that expectation
once again—to persuade people to make
decisions as they did in the 1950s, on
the belief that any rise in inflation and
interest rates will be temporary.
The Federal Reserve System was created,
in part, to deal with short-run liquidity
problems and cyclically variable prices
that were pervasive under the gold stan-
dard. These problems have been largely
solved, but a new one was created.
Instead of being anchored by a credible
commitment to price stability, today's
monetary policy process focuses on the
current state of the economy and on
short-term policy actions. One of the
reasons why the policy process is diffi-
cult to understand is that economic con-
ditions are complex and subject to
change. But these complications reflect
the problems of choosing among short-
term monetary actions in the absence of
a clear, credible long-term objective.
Short-term monetary actions without
such an objective are no more sensible
or coherent than a driver's decisions on
which direction to turn without first de-
termining a destination. As the popular
saying goes, "If you don't know where
you are going, any road will take you
there." The view might be nicer on the
road to the left, but a better path may
lie straight ahead. Short-term monetary
actions—even if chosen optimally—
have less desirable effects on the econ-




The well-known analysis of the time
consistency of policy conclusively
demonstrates that a central bank's abil-
ity to commit credibly to a long-term
objective enhances the effectiveness of
its policy and can improve overall eco-
nomic performance. The problem stems
from people's response to expected pol-
icy actions. Perhaps the clearest exam-
ple of the time consistency problem is
the public's reaction to government pro-
vision of flood insurance. If people
know that the government will pay for
rebuilding homes that are destroyed by
floods, then they will tend to keep
building homes in floodplains despite
the negative consequences.The time consistency problem arises
because many Americans are under the
mistaken impression that a little more
inflation would lead to a healthier econ-
omy. There is some logic that suggests
a surprise increase in the inflation rate
will have a temporary, and positive, effect
on real growth. This is thought to occur
if prices rise faster than wages and if
firms respond to inflated profits by in-
creasing production. In this case, infla-
tion must be not only a little higher, but
a little higher than people expect it to be,
if it is to have these supposedly beneficial
effects. But if people know the govern-
ment has an incentive to surprise them
with a little more inflation, then they
will count on an even higher inflation
rate, and so on, until the rate is so astro-
nomical that its detrimental effects are
obvious and no one would seek a higher
rate. The result of this kind of thinking is
what led to the spiraling inflation of the
late 1970s and the political support for the
disinflationary policies of the early 1980s.
The challenge is to restore credibility to
the idea that the price level will be stable
over long periods of time. The ideal is
a monetary regime that would have the
credibility of the pre-World War I gold
standard without the destabilizing ele-
ments that led to its demise. Establish-
ment of such an environment requires a
clear and credible commitment, backed
by incentives and constraints, to main-
taining the purchasing power of the
dollar—and not simply in the short term.
• A Specific Proposal
An anchor for the value of money can
be created by adopting a long-term ob-
jective for the Consumer Price Index.
The research staff at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland has been studying
the strengths and weaknesses of the CPI
for this purpose. We urge others in the
Federal Reserve System and in academic
research centers to continue such work.
So far, we have found little reason to
choose anything but the CPI as a long-
run measure of the purchasing power
of the dollar. Over shorter horizons,
however, we do find it useful to look
closely at the index and to temporarily
disregard erratic movements in sectors
that are suffering extreme supply condi-
tions. For example, there have been
several times in the last decade when
the CPI excluding food and energy was
a better measure of the underlying in-
flation trend than was the full index.
But this is important only in using the
CPI as a short-run guide; over the long
haul, these factors wash out.
Our long-run goal should be to stabilize
the level of the CPI at some future date.
Because the decisions of businesses and
households are conditioned by past
experience, an immediate move to price-
level stability would cause significant
misallocation of resources and redistri-
bution of wealth. Minimization of such
transitional effects requires the adoption
of both a valuation and a future date that
delivers the purchasing power that is
widely expected over the short term.
The CPI averaged 100 during the 1982-
84 period; today, the index stands at 145,
meaning that the average level of prices
is now almost 50 percent higher than it
was 10 years ago. Stated differently, a
dollar today buys just under two-thirds
of what it did in 1983. Rather than at-
tempting to freeze the dollar's purchasing
power at the current level, it seems wise
to allow current expectations of some
further erosion to be fulfilled.
In my view, it would make sense to re-
duce the current rate of inflation gradu-
ally, perhaps by one-half percentage
point per year, until the price level is
stabilized. We could seek this objective
in a number of ways. For instance, as-
suming that the CPI increases by 3 per-
cent this year, annual successive half-
percentage-point decelerations would
stabilize the price level in 1999 at 154
percent of the 1982-84 base. So, one
method of reaching price level stability
would be to target a CPI level of 155 in
the year 2000, and then conduct monetary
policy to keep the index fluctuating
around that value. There are, of course,
other acceptable paths to a similar end.
No one should expect the CPI to follow
such a predetermined path slavishly. My
judgment is that the index would prob-
ably fluctuate within one-and-a-half
percentage points around such a trend.
It would be useful to establish limits, say
3 percent above and 3 percent below its
permanent trend, in order to make ex-
plicit some range of discretion—a band
within which the Federal Reserve could be
given a free rein to respond to changing
economic conditions. These 3 percent
limits would serve as a warning, alert-
ing policymakers and the public when
short-term policies were becoming in-
consistent with the long-term objective.
• The Implementation
Short-run policy decisions would be
based on the long-term path and, as
they are now, on incoming information
and on the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee's best judgment about the future
effect of recent policy actions. Explana-
tions for the policy decisions would be
framed in the context of the long-term
objective. Publication of actual price data
and the Federal Reserve's explanations
about policy actions would help the pub-
lic to decide whether policymakers were
acting credibly to achieve the objective.
It would be important not to overreact
to short-term movements in the CPI.
The role of incoming information about
the index would become more critical
as the CPI deviated from the long-run
path: When it began to move in a way
that was unexpected and contrary to
stated policy, we would pay more atten-
tion to the data and rely less on judg-
ment. Monetary policymakers could use
this framework in deciding how to vote
on the annual monetary targets and on
short-term policy actions. In explaining
policy actions to the public, reference
to future objectives would be superior
to reference to real economic variables.
It is a mistake to think that a monetary
policy that tolerates inflation would be
better for the economic prospects of
this nation. The financial press has not
been effective in its coverage of this
message. Reporters like to see every-
thing in simple contrasts: hawks versus
doves, or real growth versus inflation.
Academic researchers have moved be-
yond the simple monetarist/Keynesian
debate that gave rise to the hawks versus
doves analogy and have now adopted the
view that expectations are important for
price formation in all markets. Under this
general view, targeting the price level di-
rectly is a good idea because it allows ex-
pectations to work for the policymaker to
help achieve the objective.This research doesn't seem to have had
much impact in the policy arena, how-
ever. There, where policymakers have
lost confidence in the M2 target as a
guide for policy, the latest fashion is a
credit view of monetary policy. This
is really just another attempt to over-
simplify a rather complicated process.
People who take this view think that
monetary policy operates by creating a
gap between the cost of funds to banks
and the rate at which they lend. It also
suggests that understanding the stance
of monetary policy requires a close
look at interest rates and bank lending.
This is not a new view, but I find it
increasingly less compelling as people
and firms find ever-new sources of
financing. While it is certainly important
to keep communication simple, it is
also useful for many purposes to under-
stand how monetary policy affects bank
lending and how bank lending, in turn,
affects the real economy. But the chan-
nels of policy encompass more than this
one view. Both concepts, the monetarist
emphasis on the monetary aggregates
and the recent reemphasis on credit, are
incomplete: They fail to account for the
way expectations about future inflation
influence economic decision-making at
all levels and in all markets.
• Benefits of an Explicit
Objective for the CPI
We argue for a nominal anchor for the
price level because we want to limit the
range of expectations about future infla-
tion, as well as to ensure that the outcome
will be consistent with those expecta-
tions. In the last 30 years, economists
have uncovered little additional infor-
mation about how monetary policy
works, except for the finding that expec-
tations of future policy are vitally im-
portant in the process. We have learned
that resource allocation decisions today
depend on individuals' expectations
about the future price level, a situation
that in turn depends on what people
expect of monetary policy.
Unfortunately, without a nominal an-.
chor, it is difficult for people to learn
about future monetary policy. A policy
of price stability based on a constant
value of the CPI would provide a nomi-
nal anchor for the dollar. Further, it
would enhance credibility by providing
a clear standard by which to measure
the success of policy.
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